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Abstract
This paper proves that several interactive proof systems are zero-knowledge against quantum attacks.
This includes a few well-known classical zero-knowledge proof systems as well as quantum interactive
proof systems for the complexity class QSZKHV, which comprises all problems having “honest veri-
fier” quantum statistical zero-knowledge proofs. It is also proved that zero-knowledge proofs for every
language in NP exist that are secure against quantum attacks, assuming the existence of quantum com-
putationally concealing commitment schemes. Previously no non-trivial proof systems were known
to be zero-knowledge against quantum attacks, except in restricted settings such as the honest-verifier
and common reference string models. This paper therefore establishes for the first time that true zero-
knowledge is indeed possible in the presence of quantum information and computation.
1 Introduction
It is clearly to the benefit of honest users of a given cryptosystem that security of the system is proved under
as wide a range of malicious attacks as possible. At the same time it is desirable that honest users of the
system are subjected to as few resource requirements as possible. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
the security of zero-knowledge proof systems against adversaries that use quantum computers to attack these
systems. Although quantum interactive proof systems are considered in this paper, our primary focus will
be on the case of greatest practical interest, which is the case where honest parties are not required to use
quantum computers to implement the proof systems.
The notion of zero-knowledge, first introduced in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89], is
of central importance in theoretical cryptography. Informally speaking, an interactive proof system has the
property of being zero-knowledge if verifiers that interact with the honest prover of the system learn nothing
from the interaction beyond the validity of the statement being proved. At first consideration this notion
may seem to be paradoxical, but indeed several interesting computational problems that are not known to
be polynomial-time computable admit zero-knowledge interactive proof systems in the classical setting.
Examples include the graph isomorphism [GMW91] and quadratic residuosity [GMR89] problems, certain
lattice problems [GG00], and the statistical difference [SV03] and entropy difference [GV99] problems that
concern outputs of boolean circuits with random inputs. (The fact that the last three examples have interac-
tive proof systems that are zero-knowledge relies on a fundamental result of Goldreich, Sahai and Vadhan
[GSV98] equating zero-knowledge with “honest verifier” zero-knowledge in certain settings.) Under certain
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intractability assumptions, every language in NP has a zero-knowledge interactive proof system [GMW91].
A related notion is that of an interactive argument, wherein computational restrictions on the prover allow for
zero-knowledge protocols having somewhat different characteristics than protocols in the usual interactive
proof system setting [BCC88].
Within the context of quantum information and computation it is natural to consider the implications
of the quantum model to the notion of zero-knowledge, and indeed this has been a topic of investigation
for several years. Despite this fact, however, relatively little progress has been made—even the first step
of formulating a cryptographically reasonable, general definition of quantum zero-knowledge and applying
this definition to any non-trivial computational problem was not taken previous to this paper. The difficulty,
which was apparently first discussed by van de Graaf [Gra97], has been that when the most natural quantum
analogues of the classical definitions of zero-knowledge were considered, the resulting definitions appeared
to be too strict to be applied to non-trivial proof systems, including those systems already proved to be zero-
knowledge in the classical setting. This has left open several possibilities, including the possibility that any
“correct” definition of quantum zero-knowledge would necessarily be qualitatively different from the usual
classical definitions, as well as the possibility that zero-knowledge is simply impossible in a quantum world.
There are multiple classical variants of zero-knowledge that differ in the specific way that the notion
of “learning nothing” is formalized. In each variant, it is viewed that a particular verifier learns nothing if
there exists a polynomial-time simulator whose output is indistinguishable from the output of the verifier
after interacting with the prover on any positive instance of the problem. The different variants concern
the strength of this indistinguishability. In particular, perfect and statistical zero-knowledge refer to the
situation where the simulator’s output and the verifier’s output are indistinguishable in an information-
theoretic sense and computational zero-knowledge refers to the weaker restriction that the simulator’s output
and the verifier’s output cannot be distinguished by any computationally efficient procedure.
It is straightforward to formulate fairly direct and natural quantum analogues of the definitions of these
classical variants of zero-knowledge. Known proofs that specific proof systems are zero-knowledge with
respect to these classical definitions, however, do not translate directly to the quantum setting. The main
obstacle when proving that a given proof system is zero-knowledge is of course the construction of a simu-
lator for every possible deviant polynomial-time verifier. Although there are different techniques for doing
this, the most typical method involves the simulator treating a given verifier as a black box: the simulator
randomly produces transcripts, or parts of transcripts, of possible interactions between a prover and verifier,
and feeds parts of these transcripts to the given verifier. If the verifier produces a message that is not consis-
tent with the other parts of the transcript that were produced, the simulator “rewinds”, meaning that it backs
up and tries again to randomly generate parts of the transcript. By storing intermediate results, and repeating
different parts of this process until the given verifier’s output is consistent with a randomly generated tran-
script, the simulation is eventually successful. The reason why this technique cannot generally be applied
directly to quantum verifiers is based on the facts that (i) quantum information cannot be copied, and (ii)
measurements are irreversible processes—their effects cannot in general be undone. If a simulator runs a
given verifier as a black box and the simulation is unsuccessful, it is not clear how to rewind the process and
try again; intermediate states of the system cannot be copied, and running the verifier may have involved an
irreversible measurement. More significantly, the determination of whether the simulation was successful
will itself represent an irreversible measurement in general. Other methods of constructing simulators for
quantum verifiers have also not been successful in the general setting. Further discussions of this issue can
be found in [Gra97] and [DFS04].
There are several “weaker” notions of zero-knowledge that are of interest and have been studied, both
in the quantum and classical cases. Of particular interest with respect to previous work on quantum zero-
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knowledge is the common reference string model, wherein it is assumed that an honest third party samples a
string from some specified distribution and provides both the prover and verifier with this string at the start of
the interaction. Damga˚rd, Fehr, and Salvail [DFS04] proved several interesting results concerning quantum
zero-knowledge protocols in this context. Their results are centered on what they call the no quantum
rewinding paradigm, where the central issue concerning simulator constructions discussed above is partially
circumvented by making use of common reference strings as well as certain unproved quantum complexity-
theoretic assumptions. Their results are also mostly concerned with interactive arguments, which require
computational restrictions on the prover to establish soundness. Another weaker notion of zero-knowledge
is “honest verifier” zero-knowledge, which only requires a simulator that outputs the verifier’s view of
the interaction between the honest parties V and P . A quantum variant of honest verifier statistical zero
knowledge was considered in [Wat02], wherein it was proved that the resulting complexity class shares
many of the basic properties of its classical counterpart [SV03]. A non-interactive variant of this notion was
studied by Kobayashi [Kob03]. The problematic issue regarding simulator constructions does not occur in
honest verifier settings.
The present paper essentially resolves the main difficulties previously associated with quantum ana-
logues of zero-knowledge. This is done by establishing that the most natural quantum analogues of the clas-
sical definitions of zero-knowledge indeed can be applied to a large class of proof systems. This includes
several well-known classical proof systems as well as quantum proof systems for many problems, in partic-
ular the class of all problems admitting quantum proof systems that are statistical zero-knowledge against
honest verifiers. We therefore prove unconditionally that zero-knowledge indeed is possible in the pres-
ence of quantum information and computation, and moreover that the notion of quantum zero-knowledge
is correctly captured by the most natural and direct quantum analogues of the classical definitions. The
basic technique we use in the paper is algorithmic in nature: we show how to construct efficient quantum
simulators for arbitrary quantum polynomial-time deviant verifiers for several proof systems. The proof that
these simulators operate correctly involves a simple spectral property of measurement operators resulting
from the most straightforward (but not always successful) simulator constructions, combined with a fact that
previously was used to reduce errors in QMA proof systems without increasing witness sizes [MW05].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses definitions of zero-knowledge,
including standard classical definitions and quantum analogues of these definitions. Section 3 focuses on the
well-known zero-knowledge graph isomorphism protocol of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW91],
proving that this protocol is zero-knowledge against quantum attacks. It is intended that this proof illustrates,
in a simple and familiar setting, a more general method that can be applied to several other protocols. Some
other protocols that can be proved zero-knowledge using this method are discussed in Section 4. The paper
concludes with Section 5, which mentions some possible directions for future work.
2 Definitions of Zero-Knowledge
This paper assumes the reader is familiar with the notions of interactive proof systems, zero-knowledge,
and quantum computation. Further information on interactive proof systems and zero knowledge can be
found, for instance, in [Gol01, Gol02]. Standard references for quantum computation and information
include [NC00, KSV02]. Quantum computational variants of interactive proof systems were studied in
[Wat03, KW00].
In this paper, interactive proof systems will be specified by pairs (V, P ) representing honest verifier
and honest prover strategies. The soundness property of such an interactive proof system concerns interac-
tions between pairs (V, P ′) and the zero-knowledge property concerns interactions between pairs (V ′, P ),
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where P ′ and V ′ deviate adversarily from P and V , respectively. It may be the case that a given pair of
interacting strategies is such that both are classical, both are quantum, or one is classical and the other is
quantum. When either or both of the strategies is classical, all communication between them is (naturally)
assumed to be classical—only two quantum strategies are permitted to transmit quantum information to one
another. It will always be assumed that verifier strategies are represented by polynomial-time (quantum or
classical) computations. Depending on the setting of interest, the honest prover strategy P may either be
computationally unrestricted or may be represented by a polynomial-time (quantum or classical) computa-
tion augmented by specific information about the input string, such as a witness for an NP problem. Deviant
prover strategies P ′ will always be assumed to be computationally unrestricted. (A proof system (V, P ) for
which the soundness property requires a computational assumption on P ′ is called an interactive argument
[BCC88]. Although the results of the present paper are applicable to interactive arguments, none are specific
to arguments, so for simplicity they are not discussed further.)
For a given promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano), we say that a pair (V, P ) is an interactive proof system
for A having completeness error εc and soundness error εs if (i) for every input x ∈ Ayes, the interaction
between P and V causes V to accept with probability at least 1 − εc, and (ii) for every input x ∈ Ano and
every prover strategy P ′, the interaction between P ′ and V causes V to accept with probability at most εs.
It may be the case that εc and εs are constant or are functions of the length of the input string x. When
they are functions, it is assumed that they can be computed deterministically in polynomial time. It is
generally desired that εc and εs be exponentially small. As sequential repetition followed by majority vote,
or unanimous vote in case εc = 0, reduces these errors exponentially quickly, it is usually sufficient that
1−εc−εs is lower-bounded by the reciprocal of a polynomial. (The same may be said of parallel repetition,
but the zero-knowledge property to be discussed shortly will generally be lost in this case.)
There are different notions of what it means for an interactive proof system (V, P ) for a promise problem
A to be zero-knowledge. Let us first discuss the completely classical case, meaning that only classical
strategies are considered for the honest verifier V and any deviant verifiers V ′. An arbitrary verifier V ′ takes
two strings as input—a string x representing the common input to both the verifier and prover, as well as a
string w called an auxiliary input, which is not known to the prover and which may influence the verifier’s
behavior during the interaction. Based on the interaction with P , the verifier V ′ produces a string as output.
Let n,m : {0, 1}∗ → N be polynomially-bounded functions representing the length of the auxiliary input
string and output string: assuming the common input string is x, the auxiliary input is a string of length
n(x) and the output is a string of length m(x). Because there may be randomness used by either or both of
the strategies P and V ′, the verifier’s output will in general be random. The random variable representing
the verifier’s output will be written (V ′(w), P )(x). For the honest verifier V , we may view that n = 0 and
m = 1, because there is no auxiliary input and the output is a single bit that indicates whether the verifier
accepts or rejects.
By a (classical) simulator we mean a polynomial-time randomized algorithm S that takes strings w and
x, with |w| = n(x), as input and produces some output string of length m(x). Such a simulator’s output
is a random variable denoted S(w, x). Now, for a given promise problem A, we say that a proof system
(V, P ) for A is zero-knowledge if, for every verifier V ′ there exists a simulator S such that (V ′(w), P )(x)
and S(w, x) are indistinguishable for every choice of strings x ∈ Ayes and w ∈ {0, 1}n(x). The specific
formalization of the word “indistinguishable” gives rise to different variants of zero-knowledge. Statistical
zero-knowledge refers to the situation in which (V (w), P )(x) and S(w, x) have negligible statistical differ-
ence, and computational zero-knowledge refers to the situation in which no boolean circuit with size poly-
nomial in |x| can distinguish (V ′(w), P )(x) and S(w, x) with a non-negligible advantage over randomly
guessing. (Perfect zero-knowledge is slightly stronger than statistical zero-knowledge in that it essentially
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requires a zero-error simulation: the simulator may report failure with small probability, and conditioned on
the simulator not reporting failure the outputs S(w, x) and (V ′(w), P )(x) are identically distributed.)
Two points concerning the above definitions should be mentioned. The first point concerns the auxiliary
input, which actually was not included in the definitions given in the very first papers on zero-knowledge (but
which already appeared in the 1989 journal version of [GMR89]). The inclusion of an auxiliary input in the
definition is needed to prove that zero-knowledge proof systems are closed under sequential composition.
Perhaps more important is that the inclusion of auxiliary inputs in the definition captures the notion that a
given zero-knowledge proof system cannot be used to increase knowledge. The second point concerns the
order of quantification between V ′ and S. Specifically, the definition states that a zero-knowledge proof
system is one such that for all V ′ there exists a simulator S that satisfies the requisite properties. There is a
good argument to be made for reversing these quantifiers by requiring that for a given proof system (V, P )
there should exist a single simulator S that interfaces in some uniform way with any given V ′ to produce
an output that is indistinguishable from that verifier’s output. Typical simulator constructions, as well as the
ones that will be discussed in this paper in the quantum setting, do indeed satisfy this stronger requirement.
Next let us discuss the case where a given deviant verifier strategy V ′ may be quantum. This includes
the possibility that V is classical or quantum, and likewise for P . Similar to the completely classical case,
a given strategy V ′ will take, in addition to the input string x, an auxiliary input, and produce some output.
The most general situation allowed by quantum information theory is that both the auxiliary input and the
output are quantum states. Moreover, it may be the case that the auxiliary input state qubits are entangled
with some other qubits that are not accessible to the verifier or simulator, but are available to any proce-
dure that attempts to distinguish between the verifier and simulator outputs. It is intended that this is a
strong assumption, but it can easily be argued that no sensible definition would forbid this possibility; one
can imagine natural situations in which potential attacks could be based on entangled states in the sense
described.
Similar to the classical case, it will be assumed that for every verifier strategy V ′ there exist polynomially
bounded functions n and m that specify the number of auxiliary input qubits and output qubits of V ′. The
interaction of V ′ with P on input x is a physical process, and therefore induces some admissible mapping
Φx from n(x) qubits to m(x) qubits. This means that Φx : L(W) → L(Z) is a completely positive and
trace preserving linear map, where W and Z are Hilbert spaces corresponding to the n(x) auxiliary input
qubits and the m(x) output qubits, and L(W) and L(Z) denote the spaces of linear operators (including the
density operators) acting on W and Z , respectively. Likewise, a simulator S given by some polynomial-
time quantum computation that takes as input the string x along with n(x) auxiliary input qubits and outputs
m(x) qubits will give rise to some admissible mapping Ψx : L(W)→ L(Z).
We may now define variants of zero-knowledge based on different notions of indistinguishability of
these mappings Φx and Ψx. The correct quantum analogue of statistical zero-knowledge requires that
‖Φx −Ψx‖⋄ is negligible, where ‖ · ‖⋄ denotes Kitaev’s “diamond” norm [Kit97, KSV02, AKN98]. In-
formally this implies that no physical process can distinguish Φx and Ψx given a single “black-box” access
to one of the two mappings, including the possibility that the mapping is applied to just one part of a larger,
possibly entangled state. Under the assumption that ‖Φx −Ψx‖⋄ is negligible, it can be argued that no poly-
nomial number of black-box accesses to Φx or Ψx would suffice to distinguish the two with non-negligible
probability. Computational zero-knowledge is formulated similarly, except that the distinguishing procedure
must be specified by a polynomial-size quantum circuit. Because we only discuss quantum computational
zero-knowledge in Section 4, a more precise definition will be postponed until then.
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3 The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson Graph Isomorphism Proof System
The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson graph isomorphism protocol is a well-known example of a proof system
that is perfect zero-knowledge against classical polynomial-time verifiers. In this section it is proved that
this protocol is in fact zero-knowledge against polynomial-time quantum verifiers. The purpose of focusing
on this particular protocol is that it provides a simple example where nevertheless the difficulties associated
with constructing simulators for quantum verifiers are present. The proof that this proof system remains
zero-knowledge against quantum attacks also illustrates clearly the basic method being proposed in this
paper. The method can be extended to several other protocols as described in the next section.
The protocol is described in Figure 1. It has perfect completeness and soundness error 1/2; if G0 ∼= G1,
then V accepts with certainty, while ifG0 6∼= G1 then no prover P ′ can convince V to accept with probability
greater than 1/2. The proof system has the property that if the prover P has knowledge of an isomorphism
σ : G1 7→ G0, then it may be taken to run in polynomial time. For an arbitrary choice of σ, the proof system
(V, P ) is perfect zero-knowledge with respect to any classical polynomial-time verifier V ′. Sequential
repetition followed by a unanimous vote can be used to decrease the soundness error to an exponentially
small quantity while preserving the perfect completeness and classical zero-knowledge properties.
Zero-Knowledge Protocol for Graph Isomorphism
Assume the input is a pair (G0, G1) of simple, undirected graphs each having vertex set {1, . . . , n}.
Prover’s step 1: Let σ ∈ Sn be a permutation satisfying σ(G1) = G0 if G0 ∼= G1, and let σ be the identity
permutation otherwise. Choose pi ∈ Sn uniformly at random and send H = pi(G0) to the verifier.
Verifier’s step 1: Choose a ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and send a to the prover.
Prover’s step 2: Let τ = piσa and send τ to the verifier.
Verifier’s step 2: Accept if τ(Ga) = H , reject otherwise.
Figure 1: The Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW91] zero-knowledge graph isomorphism protocol.
We wish to show that this protocol is zero-knowledge with respect to polynomial-time quantum verifiers.
It will be sufficient to consider a restricted type of verifier as follows:
• In addition to (G0, G1), the verifier takes a quantum register W as input, representing the auxiliary
quantum input. The verifier will use two additional quantum registers that function as work space: V,
which is an arbitrary (polynomial-size) register, and A, which is a single qubit register. The registers V
and A are initialized to their all-zero states before the protocol begins.
• In the first message, the prover P sends a graph H on n vertices. For each graph H there corresponds
a unitary operator VH that the verifier applies to the registers (W,V,A). After applying the appropriate
transformation VH , the verifier measures the register A with respect to the standard basis, and sends the
resulting bit a to the prover.
• The prover responds with some permutation τ ∈ Sn. Because we are concerned only with the zero-
knowledge properties of the system, we assume the verifier does not make a decision to accept or reject,
but simply outputs the registers (W,V,A), along with the classical messages H and τ sent by the prover
during the protocol.
Note that a verifier of this form is completely determined by the collection {VH}.
An arbitrary verifier can be modeled as a verifier of this restricted form followed by some polynomial-
time post-processing of this verifier’s output. The same post-processing can be applied to the output of the
simulator that will be constructed for the given restricted verifier. We also note that it can be shown that a
sequential repetition of the proof system will also result in a zero-knowledge proof system against quantum
verifiers, based on the fact that the auxiliary input may be an arbitrary quantum state.
The mapping induced by the actual interaction
Let us begin by considering the admissible transformation induced by an interaction of a verifier of the above
type with the prover P in the case that G0 ∼= G1. Although the messages sent from the prover to the verifier
are classical messages, it will simplify matters to view them as being stored in quantum registers denoted Y
and Z, respectively. (Later, when we consider simulations of the interaction, we will need quantum registers
to store these messages anyway, and it is helpful to have the registers used in the actual protocol and in the
simulation share the same names.) With each register we associate a Hilbert space, and use the same letter
in different fonts for matching registers and spaces—for example, W is the space associated with register
W, V is the space associated with register V, and so on. Let |0V⊗A〉 ∈ V ⊗A denote the initial all-zero state
of the registers (V,A). Let us also write Gn to denote the set of all simple, undirected graphs having vertex
set {1, . . . , n}.
For each H ∈ Gn and each a ∈ {0, 1}, define a linear mapping MH,a ∈ L(W,W ⊗V) as
MH,a = (IW⊗V ⊗ 〈a|) VH(IW ⊗ |0V⊗A〉).
If the initial state of the register W is a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ W , then the state of the registers (W,V,A) after the
verifier applies VH is (MH,0|ψ〉)|0〉+(MH,1|ψ〉)|1〉, and therefore the state of the registers (W,V,A) after
the verifier applies VH and measures A in the standard basis is
∑
a∈{0,1}
MH,a|ψ〉〈ψ|M∗H,a ⊗ |a〉〈a|.
The admissible map that results from the interaction is now easily described by incorporating the de-
scription of P . It is described by Φ ∈ T(W,W ⊗V ⊗A⊗Y ⊗ Z) given by
Φ(X) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
a∈{0,1}
MH,aXM
∗
H,a ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ |pi(G0)〉〈pi(G0)| ⊗ |piσa〉〈piσa | (1)
for all X ∈ L(W).
Description of the simulator
A classical simulation for a classical verifier V ′ in the above protocol may be obtained as follows. The
simulator randomly choose a permutation pi and a bit b, and feeds pi(Gb) to V ′. This verifier chooses a bit a
for its message back to the prover. If a = b, the simulator can easily complete the simulation, otherwise it
“rewinds” and tries a new choice of pi and b. With very high probability, the simulator will succeed after no
more than a polynomial number of steps.
Our procedure for simulating the verifier described by a collection {VH : H ∈ Gn} will require two
registers B and R in addition to W, V, A, Y, and Z. The register R may be viewed as a quantum register
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whose basis states correspond to the possible random choices that a typical classical simulator would use. In
the present case this means a random permutation together with a random bit. The register B will represent
the simulator’s “guess” for the verifier’s message. For convenience, let us defineX = V⊗A⊗Y⊗B⊗Z⊗R,
which is the Hilbert space corresponding to all registers aside from W, and let |0X 〉 denote the all-zero state
of these registers.
The procedure, which is described in Figure 2, will involve a composition of a few operations that we
now describe. First, let T be any unitary operator acting on registers (Y,B,Z,R) that maps the initial all-zero
state of these four registers to the state
1√
2n!
∑
b∈{0,1}
∑
pi∈Sn
|pi(Gb)〉|b〉|pi〉|pi, b〉.
If the space corresponding to register R is traced out, the state of registers (Y,B,Z) corresponds to a classical
probability distribution over triples (pi(Gb), b, pi) for b and pi chosen uniformly. Next, define a unitary
operator V acting on registers (W,V,A,Y) that effectively uses Y as a control register, applying VH to
registers (W,V,A) for each possible graph H ∈ Gn representing a standard basis state of Y. In other words,
V =
∑
H∈Gn VH ⊗ |H 〉〈H |. The operators T and V are tensored with the identity on the remaining spaces
when we wish to view them both as operators on W ⊗X .
Finally, we need to define a binary-valued projective measurement on the above registers whose outcome
is the exclusive-OR of A and B (with respect to the standard basis). We will let Π0 and Π1 denote the
projection operators corresponding to this measurement. Viewed as projections on A⊗B, these projections
can be written Π0 = |00〉〈00| + |11〉〈11| and Π1 = |01〉〈01| + |10〉〈10|. It will be more convenient,
however, to view Π0 and Π1 as projections on the entire space W ⊗X , so the above projections should be
tensored with the identity operator on W ⊗V ⊗ Y ⊗ Z ⊗R.
Simulation Procedure
Input and initial conditions:
The auxiliary input is register W.
The registers V, A, Y, B, Z, and R are initialized to the state |0X 〉.
Main procedure:
Perform the unitary transformation T followed by the unitary transformation V .
Perform the measurement described by {Π0,Π1}.
If the outcome of the measurement is 1:
Perform the unitary transformation V ∗ followed by T ∗.
Perform a phase flip in case any of the qubits in any of the registers aside from W is not set to 0.
In other words, perform the unitary transformation IW ⊗ (2|0X 〉〈0X | − IX ).
Perform the unitary transformation T followed by the unitary transformation V .
Halt and output registers (W,V,A,Y,Z). (Registers B and R are traced out.)
Figure 2: The simulation procedure for the graph isomorphism protocol.
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Analysis of the simulator
Now we will consider the mapping induced by the simulation procedure described in Figure 2. We are only
concerned with its behavior in the case that G0 ∼= G1, so this assumption is made hereafter.
We will first analyze the behavior of the simulator in the case that the register W is in a pure state
|ψ〉 ∈ W . The analysis of the general case where W is in a mixed state, and is possibly entangled with
other registers not accessible to the simulator, will follow easily from the pure state case. The remaining
registers (V,A,Y,B,Z,R) begin the simulation in state |0X 〉. The initial state of all of the registers together
is therefore |γ0〉 def= |ψ〉|0X 〉. The simulator first performs the unitary transformation T followed by V ,
which transforms the state of the system to
V T |γ0〉 = 1√
2n!
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
∑
pi∈Sn
(Mpi(Gb),a|ψ〉)|a〉|pi(Gb)〉|b〉|pi〉|pi, b〉.
Next, the measurement {Π0,Π1} is performed. There are two possible measurement outcomes that will be
considered separately.
The easier case is that the measurement outcome is 0, in which case the simulator does nothing more
than to output (W,V,A,Y,Z), discarding the remaining two registers B and R. Using the fact that pi(G0) =
piσb(Gb), we see that
trB⊗R (Π0V T |γ0〉〈γ0 |T ∗V ∗Π0)
=
1
2n!
∑
a∈{0,1}
∑
τ∈Sn
Mτ(G0),a|ψ〉〈ψ|M∗τ(G0),a ⊗ |a〉〈a| ⊗ |τ(G0)〉〈τ(G0)| ⊗ |τσa〉〈τσa |
=
1
2
Φ(|ψ〉〈ψ|),
where Φ is the admissible map of Eq. 1 that corresponds to an actual interaction of V with P . It therefore
holds that the simulator is correct conditioned on the measurement outcome being 0. Let us also note that
the probability associated with outcome 0 is the trace of this operator, which is 1/2. Of course it is intuitive
that this probability should be 1/2, and that the simulator is correct in this case—the more difficult case is
when the measurement result is 1.
In order to understand the behavior of the simulator in case the measurement result is 1, it will be helpful
to define two additional projections: ∆0 = IW ⊗ |0X 〉〈0X | and ∆1 = IW⊗X −∆0. The unitary operator
IW ⊗ (2|0X 〉〈0X | − IX ) performed during the simulation procedure may equivalently be written ∆0−∆1.
At this point we will need to prove the claim that follows. Although it is not difficult to prove, it is a key
step in the analysis of the simulator, and is isolated as a separate claim to highlight this fact.
Claim 1. The vector |γ0〉 is an eigenvector of the operator ∆0T ∗V ∗Π0V T∆0, with corresponding eigen-
value λ = 1/2.
Proof. The claim will hold regardless of the choice of |ψ〉. To see that this is the case, define
Q = (IW ⊗ 〈0X |)T ∗V ∗Π0V T (IW ⊗ |0X 〉).
The operator Q may be viewed as a measurement operator; the pair {Q, I − Q} describes the measure-
ment that is effectively performed on register W when the remaining registers are initialized, the uni-
tary transformation V T is performed, and the measurement {Π0,Π1} is performed. We have observed
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that this measurement outcome is 0 with probability 1/2, so for every unit vector |φ〉 ∈ W we have
〈φ|Q|φ〉 = ‖Π0V T (|φ〉|0X 〉)‖2 = 12 .
Like every operator in L(W), the operator Q is uniquely determined by the function |φ〉 7→ 〈φ|Q|φ〉
defined on the unit sphere in W , which implies that Q = 12IW . Therefore
∆0T
∗V ∗Π0UT∆0 = (IW ⊗ |0X 〉)Q(IW ⊗ 〈0X |) = 1
2
IW ⊗ |0X 〉〈0W |.
Clearly |γ0〉 = |ψ〉|0X 〉 is an eigenvector of this operator with corresponding eigenvalue 1/2, which com-
pletes the proof of the claim.
Next, we will make use of a lemma that states a fact first proved in [MW05], where it was used to
analyze an error reduction method for the class QMA. Because the proof is short it is included here for
convenience.
Lemma 2. Let U,Π0,Π1,∆0,∆1 ∈ L(H) be linear operators on a given Hilbert space H such that U is
unitary and Π0, Π1, ∆0, and ∆1 are projections satisfying ∆0 = I−∆1 and Π0 = I−Π1. Suppose further
that |γ0〉 ∈ H is a unit eigenvector of ∆0U∗Π0U∆0 with corresponding eigenvalue λ ∈ (0, 1). Define
|δ0〉 = Π0U |γ0〉√
λ
, |δ1〉 = Π1U |γ0〉√
1− λ , and |γ1〉 =
∆1U
∗|δ0〉√
1− λ .
Then 〈γ0 |γ1〉 = 〈δ0 |δ1〉 = 0 and
U |γ0〉 =
√
λ|δ0〉+
√
1− λ|δ1〉,
U |γ1〉 =
√
1− λ|δ0〉 −
√
λ|δ1〉.
Proof. First let us note that because |γ0〉 is an eigenvector of ∆0U∗Π0U∆0 and the corresponding eigen-
value λ is nonzero, it holds that ∆0|γ0〉 = |γ0〉. By the definition of |γ1〉, |δ0〉, and |δ1〉 it also holds that
∆1|γ1〉 = |γ1〉, Π0|δ0〉 = |δ0〉, and Π1|δ1〉 = |δ1〉. Consequently 〈γ0 |γ1〉 = 〈δ0 |δ1〉 = 0.
The equation U |γ0〉 = λ|δ0〉 +
√
1− λ|δ1〉 is immediate from the definitions of |δ0〉 and |δ1〉, along
with the fact that Π0 = I −Π1. Because
∆0U
∗|δ0〉√
λ
=
∆0U
∗Π0U∆0|γ0〉
λ
= |γ0〉,
it also holds that U∗|δ0〉 =
√
λ|γ0〉+
√
1− λ|γ1〉, and thus U |γ1〉 =
√
1− λ|δ0〉 −
√
λ|δ1〉.
It will be helpful when applying this lemma to note that for U unitary and λ real, the following two sets
of equations are equivalent:
U |γ0〉 =
√
λ|δ0〉+
√
1− λ|δ1〉 U∗|δ0〉 =
√
λ|γ0〉+
√
1− λ|γ1〉
U |γ1〉 =
√
1− λ|δ0〉 −
√
λ|δ1〉 U∗|δ1〉 =
√
1− λ|γ0〉 −
√
λ|γ1〉.
With Lemma 2 in hand, it now becomes simple to analyze the behavior of the simulation procedure in
the case where the measurement outcome is 1. Specifically, let us define
|δ0〉 =
√
2Π0V T |γ0〉, |δ1〉 =
√
2Π1V T |γ0〉, and |γ1〉 =
√
2∆1T
∗V ∗|δ0〉.
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We have V T |γ0〉 = 1√2 |δ0〉 +
1√
2
|δ1〉, so that conditioned on the measurement outcome 0 or 1 the state of
the entire system becomes |δ0〉 or |δ1〉, respectively. We have already observed that obtaining outcome 0
represents a successful simulation, as trB⊗R |δ0〉〈δ0 | = Φ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) corresponds to the output of the actual
interaction of V with P . In case the measurement outcome is 1 the state collapses to |δ1〉, at which point the
operators (V T )∗, ∆0 −∆1, and V T are applied in sequence. The operator (V T )∗ transforms the state |δ1〉
to 1√
2
|γ0〉− 1√2 |γ1〉, the operator ∆0−∆1 transforms this state to
1√
2
|γ0〉+ 1√2 |γ1〉, and finally the operator
V T transforms this state to 12 |δ0〉 + 12 |δ1〉 + 12 |δ0〉 − 12 |δ1〉 = |δ0〉. As in the case that the measurement
outcome was 0, this state represents a successful simulation.
We have thus established that the outcome of the simulation procedure is precisely Φ(|ψ〉〈ψ|) in case
the initial state of W was |ψ〉. Because the set {|ψ〉〈ψ| : |ψ〉 ∈ W, ‖|ψ〉‖ = 1} spans all of L(W), and
the map induced by the simulation procedure is necessarily admissible (and therefore linear), it holds that
this map is precisely Φ. In other words, because admissible maps are uniquely determined by their action on
pure states, the map induced by the simulation procedure must be Φ; the simulation procedure implements
exactly the same admissible map as the actual interaction between V and P .
4 Other Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
The argument used in Section 3 to prove that the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson graph isomorphism protocol
is zero-knowledge against quantum attacks can be adapted to prove the same for several other protocols.
Some examples are discussed in this section—formal proofs concerning these examples will appear in the
final version of this paper.
4.1 Statistical zero-knowledge proof systems
Let us begin with the simple observation that the proof in Section 3 can easily be adapted to some other
protocols having a similar form to the protocol of Figure 1, meaning (i) P sends a message to V , (ii) V
flips a fair coin and sends the result to P , and (iii) P responds with a second message. An example of
a protocol of this form that remains zero-knowledge under quantum attacks is the quadratic residuosity
protocol of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89]. The important aspects of such protocols that may
allow the same proof to go through with very little change is that in each case there exists a simulator
whose success probability is independent of the auxiliary input state of any cheating quantum verifier. This
property translates into an analogous statement to Claim 1, which then allows Lemma 2 to be applied.
In the quantum setting, protocols of this simple form are universal for honest-verifier quantum statistical
zero-knowledge (with respect to the definition given in [Wat02]), meaning that every problem having a
quantum interactive proof that is statistical zero-knowledge with respect to an honest verifier also has a proof
system of the above form. Although such proof systems require the prover to send quantum information to
the verifier, and the verifier performs a quantum computation at the end of the protocol, the verifier’s single-
bit message is classical. (The honest prover can easily enforce this constraint just by measuring the verifier’s
message before responding to it.) This allows the proof from Section 3 to be easily adapted to this setting
as well. Letting QSZKHV denote the class of promise problems having honest-verifier quantum statistical
zero-knowledge protocols and QSZK the class of problems that are quantum statistical zero-knowledge with
respect to the definitions we have discussed in Section 2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. QSZK = QSZKHV.
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Although the statement of this corollary is analogous to the fact SZK = SZKHV of Goldreich, Sahai, and
Vadhan [GSV98], we hasten to add that the facts are only really similar on the surface—there is no similarity
in the proofs. The quantum case is greatly simplified by the fact that every problem in QSZKHV has the very
simple type of protocol discussed above. The class QSZKHV does contain SZK, implying that any problem
having a classical statistical zero-knowledge proof system (against classical verifiers) also has a quantum
interactive proof system that is statistical zero-knowledge against quantum verifiers. Unfortunately, in the
new proof system the honest prover and honest verifier are required to perform quantum computations and
the prover must send quantum information to the verifier. The question of whether every problem in SZK
has a classical proof system that is zero-knowledge against quantum attacks is not answered in this paper.
4.2 Computational zero-knowledge proof systems for NP
Finally, we will discuss computational zero-knowledge protocols for any problem in NP. Specifically, we
will consider the computational zero-knowledge proof for Graph 3-Coloring (G3C) due to Goldreich, Micali,
and Wigderson [GMW91]. Here, the input is a graph G ∈ Gn, and the prover is attempting to prove to the
verifier that G is 3-colorable. A zero-knowledge proof system for this problem yields a zero-knowledge
proof for any problem in NP, as a protocol for an arbitrary NP problem can begin with both parties computing
a reduction to 3-coloring. The fact that the zero-knowledge property is preserved under such a reduction is
discussed in [GMW91], and the quantum and classical settings do not differ in this respect. Specifically, the
input to the original problem may be incorporated into the verifier’s auxiliary input, and therefore can offer
no help in extracting knowledge from the proof system’s honest prover.
The protocol is based on the notion of a commitment scheme. Because we will require a scheme that
is meaningful in the presence of quantum computation, it will be necessary for us to discuss various issues
concerning quantum computational indistinguishability and a formal definition of the type of commitment
scheme that will be required.
Before discussing these issues, it will be helpful to mention some conventions and notation we will use
regarding quantum circuits. It will be convenient to allow quantum circuits to include two simple, non-
unitary gates: ancillary gates, which take no input and output a single qubit in state |0〉, and trace-out gates
that take one input qubit and give no output, effectively throwing the qubit in the trash. In addition to these
two gates, quantum circuits may include Toffoli gates, Hadamard gates, and imaginary-phase-shift gates
(which induce the transformation |0〉 7→ |0〉 and |1〉 7→ i|1〉), which form a universal set of unitary gates. A
quantum circuit may therefore have a different number of input and output qubits—we will say that a circuit
is of type (n,m) if it has n input qubits and m output qubits. More generally, an arbitrary admissible map
from n qubits to m qubits will be said to be of type (n,m). The size of a type (n,m) quantum circuit is
defined to be the number of gates in the circuit plus n +m. When Q is such a circuit, we identify Q with
the admissible map from n qubits to m qubits induced by running Q.
4.2.1 Quantum computationally indistinguishability and zero-knowledge
A quantum analogue of computational zero-knowledge requires a formal notion of quantum computational
indistinguishability. Here we define one such notion, first for ensembles of states and then for ensembles
of admissible mappings. In addition to forming the basis of our definition for quantum computational zero-
knowledge, the notion of quantum computational indistinguishability will be required when we formalize
the notion of a quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme.
Definition 4. (Polynomially quantum indistinguishable ensembles of states). Let S ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an
infinite set, let m : {0, 1}∗ → N be a polynomially bounded function, and let ρx and ξx be mixed states
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on m(x) qubits for each x ∈ S. Then the ensembles {ρx : x ∈ S} and {ξx : x ∈ S} are polynomially
quantum indistinguishable if, for every choice of
1. polynomials p and q,
2. a polynomially-bounded function k : {0, 1}∗ → N,
3. a collection {σx : x ∈ S}, where σx is a mixed state on k(x) qubits, and
4. a quantum circuit Q of size at most p(|x|) and type (m(x) + k(x), 1),
it holds that
|〈1|Q(ρx ⊗ σx)|1〉 − 〈1|Q(ξx ⊗ σx)|1〉| < 1
q(|x|)
for all but finitely many x ∈ S.
When {ρn : n ∈ N} and {ξn : n ∈ N} are ensembles indexed by the natural numbers, we simply
identify S with 1∗, interpreting each nwith its unary representation. Let us also note that the above definition
applies to the situation where {ρx : x ∈ S} and {ξx : x ∈ S} represent classical probability distributions,
which are special cases of mixed states.
Notice that the above definition gives a fairly strict quantum analogue to the typical non-uniform notion
of classical polynomial indistinguishability. It is strict because the non-uniformity includes an arbitrary
quantum state σx that may aid some circuit Q in the task of distinguishing ρx from ξx. In principle, this no-
tion of non-uniformity is represented by the complexity class BQP/qpoly (see [Aar05]). In the present case,
however, the “advice” state σx may depend on x rather than just |x|, and we are interested in distinguishing
quantum states (or classical probability distributions) rather than deciding language membership for strings.
An example where the state σx plays an important role is as follows. Suppose ρx and ξx are pure and
nearly orthogonal for each x. Then the ensembles {ρx} and {ξx} will fail to be polynomially quantum
indistinguishable, regardless of the complexity of the states; taking σx = ρx, say, will allow a small circuit
Q to distinguish ρx and ξx reasonably well by means of the “swap test” used in quantum fingerprinting
[BCWdW01]. The inclusion of the arbitrary state σx is important in situations (such as those we will
consider in the context of zero-knowledge) where indistinguishability of two ensembles must hold in the
presence of other “auxiliary” information.
This definition is extended to admissible mappings by simply considering ensembles that result from
applying the mappings to arbitrary polynomial-size states.
Definition 5. (Polynomially quantum indistinguishable ensembles of admissible maps). Let S ⊆
{0, 1}∗ be an infinite set and let {Φx : x ∈ S} and {Ψx : x ∈ S} be ensembles of admissible mappings
indexed by S, where for each x ∈ S the mappings Φx and Ψx are both of type (n(x),m(x)) for polynomi-
ally bounded functions n and m. Then these ensembles are polynomially quantum indistinguishable if and
only if, for every choice of
1. polynomials p and q,
2. a polynomially bounded function k : {0, 1}∗ → N,
3. a collection of mixed states {σx : x ∈ S}, where σx is a state on n(x) + k(x) qubits, and
4. a quantum circuit Q of size at most p(|x|) and type (m(x) + k(x), 1),
it holds that
|〈1|Q((Φx ⊗ I)(σx))|1〉 − 〈1|Q((Ψx ⊗ I)(σx))|1〉| < 1
q(|x|)
for all but finitely many x ∈ S.
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(Note that a slight simplification is incorporated into this definition: the input state σx to the admissible
mappings may include a part that aids a given circuit Q in distinguishing the outputs.)
Now we are prepared to state a definition for quantum computational zero-knowledge. Let (V, P ) be
a proof system (quantum or classical) for a promise problem A = (Ayes, Ano). This proof system will be
said to be a quantum computational zero-knowledge for A if, for every polynomial-time quantum verifier V ′
there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm SV ′ that satisfies the following requirements. Assume that
on input x, the verifier V ′ takes n(x) auxiliary input qubits and outputs m(x) qubits, and let Φx denote the
admissible mapping of type (n(x),m(x)) that results from the interaction of V ′ with P . Then the simulator
SV ′ must also take n(x) qubits as input and output m(x) qubits, thereby implementing a mapping Ψx of
type (n(x),m(x)). Moreover, the ensembles {Φx : x ∈ Ayes} and {Ψx : x ∈ Ayes}must be polynomially
quantum indistinguishable.
4.2.2 Quantum computationally concealing commitments
The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C zero-knowledge proof system relies on the prover’s ability to commit
to a 3-coloring of a given graph. The binding property of these commitments is required for the soundness of
the proof system, while the concealing property is required for the proof system to be zero-knowledge. It is
well-known that there cannot exist unconditionally binding and concealing commitments based on quantum
information alone [May97], and therefore one must consider commitments for which either or both of the
binding and concealing properties is based on a computational assumption. In the interactive proof system
setting, where one requires soundness against arbitrary provers, the binding property of the commitments
must be unconditional, and therefore the concealing property must be computationally-based.
Naturally, to be secure against quantum attacks, the commitment scheme that is used must in fact be
quantum computationally concealing. The existence of such schemes is of course not proved, and does not
follow from the existence of classically computationally concealing commitment schemes. For example,
good candidates for classically secure schemes based on the computational difficulty of factoring or com-
puting discrete logarithms become insecure in the quantum setting because of Shor’s algorithm [Sho97].
Classical commitments can, however, be based on arbitrary one-way functions [Nao91, HILL99], and there
are candidates for such functions that may be difficult to invert even with efficient quantum algorithms.
Functions based on lattice problems, error-correcting codes, and non-abelian group-theoretic problems rep-
resent candidates.
A protocol for quantum computationally concealing commitments based on the existence of quantum
one-way permutations is given in [AC02]. Although the definitions in [AC02] differ somewhat from ours,
in particular in that they do not consider the stronger form of non-uniformity allowing an auxiliary quantum
state that we require, the result can be translated to our setting. (This naturally requires a somewhat stronger
notion of a permutation being one-way that forbids the possibility that a quantum circuit can invert a one-way
permutation using an auxiliary input.)
It should be noted that a protocol that is in some sense complementary to the one in [AC02], in that it
is unconditionally concealing and computationally binding, was given earlier in [DMS00]. As mentioned
above, this protocol seems not to be directly applicable to the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C protocol
because the binding property can be broken by a computationally powerful party. The protocol also requires
quantum communication between honest parties, although it may be possible to achieve the same result with
only classical communication and computation along the lines of [NOVY98].
We now state our definition for the commitment schemes that we will require to ensure the zero-
knowledge property of the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C protocol against quantum verifiers. The defi-
nition is stated for an arbitrary finite set Γ; the specific choice Γ = {1, 2, 3} is used in the protocol.
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Definition 6. Let Γ be a finite set with |Γ| ≥ 2. An unconditionally binding, quantum computationally
concealing Γ-commitment scheme consists of a deterministic polynomial-time computable function f with
the following properties.
1. (Uniform length.) There exists a polynomial p such that |f(a, x)| = p(|x|) for every a ∈ Γ and
x ∈ {0, 1}∗. (This requirement is not really essential, and is only made for convenience.)
2. (Binding property.) For every choice of a 6= b ∈ Γ and x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have f(a, x) 6= f(b, y).
3. (Concealing property.) The ensembles {Fn(a) : n ∈ N} and {Fn(b) : n ∈ N} are polynomially
quantum indistinguishable for any choice of a, b ∈ Γ, where Fn(a) denotes the distribution obtained by
evaluating f(a, x) for x ∈ {0, 1}n chosen uniformly at random.
When such a scheme is used, it is assumed that some security parameter N is chosen—when one party
(the prover in the G3C protocol) wishes to commit to a value a ∈ Γ, a string x ∈ {0, 1}N is chosen
uniformly at random and the string f(a, x) is sent to the other party (the verifier in the G3C protocol). To
reveal the commitment, the first party simply sends the string x along with the value a to the second party,
who checks the validity of the decommitment by computing f(a, x) and checking equality with the first
string sent.
4.2.3 The G3C protocol with perfect commitments
Now we are ready to consider the zero-knowledge properties of the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C pro-
tocol with respect to quantum verifiers. It is helpful to begin by considering an idealized version of the
protocol assuming a perfect commitment scheme, meaning that the commitments are unconditionally bind-
ing and concealing. The proof system is described in Figure 3.
“Idealized” Zero-Knowledge Protocol for G3C
Assume the input is a graph G ∈ Gn with m edges. Repeat the following steps (sequentially) m2 times:
Prover’s step 1: Let φ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, 2, 3} be a valid 3-coloring of G if one exists (otherwise let
φ(u) = 1 for each vertex u). Let pi ∈ S3 be a randomly generated permutation of the colors {1, 2, 3}.
Commit to the values pi(φ(1)), . . . , pi(φ(n)), sending these commitments to V .
Verifier’s step 1: Uniformly choose an edge {u, v} of G and send this edge to P .
Prover’s step 2: Reveal the values pi(φ(u)) and pi(φ(v)) to V . (Assume that every possible message from
V is decoded to a valid edge in G.)
Verifier’s step 2: Check that pi(φ(u)) 6= pi(φ(v)), rejecting if not.
If the verifier has not rejected in any of the m2 iterations, it accepts.
Figure 3: The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C protocol, assuming perfect commitments.
A simulation procedure for this protocol for an arbitrary quantum polynomial-time verifier V ′ can be
constructed by simulating each iteration of the loop individually. Because each iteration allows an auxiliary
quantum input, the zero-knowledge property follows by a composition of the simulators.
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One way to construct a classical simulator for each iteration of the protocol is as follows. The simulator
uniformly chooses an edge {u, v}, and then selects a function µ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, 2, 3} uniformly, subject
to the constraint that µ(u) 6= µ(v). The simulator computes commitments of the values µ(1), . . . , µ(n). Al-
though the function µ almost certainly does not constitute a valid coloring of the graph G, the commitments
of µ(1), . . . , µ(n) are indistinguishable from commitments of pi(φ(1)), . . . , pi(φ(n)) for a valid coloring φ.
The next step depends on the verifier V ′ that the simulator is supposed to simulate. Given the commit-
ments of µ(1), . . . , µ(n), along with whatever auxiliary input it may have been given, the verifier V ′ will
choose some edge {u′, v′}. In the idealized setting where the commitments ate perfectly concealing, the
choice of {u′, v′} agrees with {u, v} with probability 1/m. Of course this will not necessarily be the case
when the commitments are only computationally concealing, which causes some technical complications
that will be addressed later. In case {u, v} = {u′, v′}, the commitments of µ(u) and µ(v) are revealed,
and the simulation of the current iteration is successful. As for an actual interaction, the revealed colors
are uniformly distributed over the six possible distinct pairs of colors. Otherwise, the entire process is re-
peated. By repeating the process O(m2) times, say, the simulator is very likely to obtain an iteration in
which {u, v} = {u′, v′}, representing a successful simulation.
Now, based on such a classical simulation, we may define a quantum simulator in a manner similar to
the one in Section 3. We assume the verifier V ′ has a similar set of registers to before, except that now A
stores an edge of G rather than just a bit. The unitary operator T now represents a unitary implementation of
the first part of the classical simulation just described, with the register R corresponding to all of the random
bits that are needed for the simulation. (This will include the random choices used for the commitments
when the non-perfect commitments are discussed.) The measurement {Π0,Π1} now corresponds to testing
that the registers A and B contain the same edge.
In the ideal commitment case, Lemma 2 would be applied with λ = 1/m. Unlike the situation where
λ = 1/2, however, as was the case for the graph isomorphism protocol, we will now need to iterate a
sequence of measurements and unitary transformations in the main simulation procedure. Instead of the
simulation succeeding with certainty, this will allow an exponentially small probability of failure. The
procedure is as follows:
1. Perform the unitary transformation U = V T .
2. Perform the measurement {Π0,Π1}. If the outcome is 0, the simulation has succeeded—halt and output
(W,V,A,Y,Z).
3. Perform the transformation U∗, followed by ∆0 −∆1, and then go to step 1.
This process may be terminated after some number of iterations depending on the desired accuracy.
Supposing that states |γ0〉, |γ1〉, |δ0〉 and |δ1〉 are defined in an analogous way to the proof in Section 3,
the first application of U maps the initial state |γ0〉 to
1√
m
|δ0〉+
√
m− 1
m
|δ1〉,
and the measurement {Π0,Π1} yields result 0 with probability 1/m. Conditioned on result 0 the state
becomes |δ0〉, which yields a successful simulation. Conditioned on result 1, which corresponds to the
case where V ′ has not chosen the same edge as the simulator, the state becomes |δ1〉, and the simulation
continues. The transformations U∗, ∆0 −∆1, and U are applied in sequence, transforming the state |δ1〉 to
2
√
m− 1
m
|δ0〉+ m− 2
m
|δ1〉.
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The process continues in this way, with each iteration yielding a successful simulation with probability at
least 1/m (and somewhat more on each iteration after the first). After a polynomial number of iterations,
the probability of a successful simulation is therefore exponentially close to 1.
4.2.4 The G3C protocol with computational commitments
Finally, we will briefly discuss the complications that arise when the argument from the previous section is
formalized when quantum computationally concealing commitments replace the perfect commitments. Our
intention here is only to provide a sketch of the proof, highlighting the aspects of the proof that differ from
the classical case. Further details will be included in the final version of the paper.
When a quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme is used in place of the idealized,
perfect commitment scheme in the protocol, there must be a specified choice for the security parameter
N . It is sufficient to set N to be equal to the number of vertices n of the input graph for the purposes
of establishing that the protocol is quantum computational zero-knowledge. The protocol is described in
Figure 4.
Computational Zero-Knowledge Protocol for 3-Coloring
Assume the input is a graph G ∈ Gn with m edges. Also assume a quantum computationally conceal-
ing {1, 2, 3}-commitment scheme is given that is described by the function f . Repeat the following steps
(sequentially) m2 times:
Prover’s step 1: Let φ : {1, . . . , n} → {1, 2, 3} be a valid 3-coloring of G if one exists (otherwise let
φ(u) = 1 for each vertex u). Let pi ∈ S3 be a randomly generated permutation of the colors {1, 2, 3}.
Choose strings r1, . . . , rn ∈ {0, 1}N uniformly at random and compute su = f(pi(φ(u)), ru) for each
u = 1, . . . , n. Send s1, . . . , sn to V .
Verifier’s step 1: Uniformly choose an edge {u, v} of G and send this edge to P .
Prover’s step 2: Send V the values a = pi(φ(u)) and b = pi(φ(v)), along with the strings ru and rv.
(Assume that every possible message from V is decoded to a valid edge in G.)
Verifier’s step 2: Check that f(a, ru) = su, f(b, rv) = sv, and a 6= b, rejecting if not.
If the verifier has not rejected in any of the m2 iterations, it accepts.
Figure 4: The Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson G3C protocol, with computational commitments.
Assume that a polynomial-time quantum verifier V ′ for a single iteration of the loop in the protocol
is given. As in the Graph Isomorphism case, it may be assumed without loss of generality that V ′ has a
restricted form, being described by a collection of unitary operators {Vy : y ∈ {0, 1}np(N)} acting on
registers W, V, A, followed by a measurement of A in the standard basis. Here, p(N) refers to the length
of each commitment. An arbitrary verifier for the entire protocol can be viewed as a composition of such
verifiers, possibly interleaved with polynomial-time quantum computations—so a simulator for each such
V ′ allows for a simulation of a general verifier. The simulator for V ′ will act precisely as described in the
perfect commitment case, substituting the computational commitments appropriately.
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There are two main issues that arise in the proof. The two issues are analogous to the issues arising in the
classical proof in [GMW91], but require some additional consideration in the quantum setting. The first issue
concerns the running time of the simulator and the second concerns the computational indistinguishability
of the simulator’s output with the actual output of an interaction.
The first issue is the more difficult one. The difficulty is that, because the commitments are not perfectly
concealing, it may no longer be assumed that every pure state |ψ〉 ∈ W is an eigenvector of the operator
Q = (IW ⊗ 〈0X |)T ∗V ∗Π0V T (IW ⊗ |0X 〉). This implies that Lemma 2 cannot be directly applied.
The classical analogue to this issue is that the classical simulator may have probability less than 1/m
to “guess” the edge that will be asked by a given V ′. Based on the fact that the commitments are compu-
tationally concealing, one may argue that the probability of a correct “guess” deviates from 1/m by some
negligible quantity. This involves a fairly straightforward hybrid argument: a significant deviation in proba-
bility from 1/m in success could be turned into an efficient procedure for breaking the concealing property
of at least one of the commitments.
In the quantum setting, a similar argument leads to the observation that although the eigenvalues of the
operator Q might no longer all be equal to 1/m, it must be the case that every eigenvalue of Q is contained
in the interval (
1
m
− ε(N), 1
m
+ ε(N)
)
for ε a negligible function. An arbitrary auxiliary quantum input |ψ〉 may then be viewed as a linear combi-
nation of eigenvectors of Q. Each eigenvector gives rise to a different collection of vectors |δ0〉, |δ1〉, |γ0〉,
and |γ1〉, which evolve independently but similarly as a result of the simulation procedure. The fact that
the eigenvalues of Q differ from one another by a negligible quantity implies that this results in a negligible
perturbation in the behavior of the simulator from the perfect commitment case.
The second issue is more straightforward. It must be demonstrated that the output of the simulator is
computationally indistinguishable from the output of an actual interaction (for an arbitrary auxiliary input).
This can be handled by adapting the classical proof to the quantum setting. Specifically, an efficient non-
uniform procedure (i.e., a polynomial-size quantum circuit together with an arbitrary auxiliary input) that
distinguishes the admissible maps corresponding to an actual interaction and the simulator defined for a
given verifier can be converted to a non-uniform procedure that violates the concealing property of the
commitment scheme, using exactly the same type of hybrid argument as above.
5 Conclusion
This paper has illustrated a method by which some interactive proof systems can be proved to be zero-
knowledge against quantum polynomial-time verifiers. A few open questions and possible directions for
further work in this area are the following:
1. Although it has not been our aim to analyze as many classical zero-knowledge protocols as possible
using this technique, it may be beneficial to consider further examples. Possibly this will help to identify
more general conditions under which protocols can be proved zero-knowledge against quantum attacks.
A specific question along these lines is whether the statistical zero-knowledge protocol that Goldreich,
Sahai, and Vadhan [GSV98] construct for any given honest verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof
system is zero-knowledge against quantum attacks.
2. The variant of the Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson 3-coloring protocol that is discussed in Section 4 re-
lies on the existence of quantum computationally binding commitment schemes. Such schemes follow
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from the existence of quantum one-way permutations [AC02]. The existence of such functions has the
potential to become one of the most important questions facing theoretical cryptography if quantum
computers are constructed. What are the most promising candidates?
3. There are several other variants of zero-knowledge such as concurrent and resettable zero-knowledge.
Do the results of this paper have implications to quantum adversaries in these settings?
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